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In combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 05-07, 95% of the USMC fixed-wing tactical aircraft (FW TACAIR), FA-18 Hornets and AV-8B Harriers, sorties were dedicated to nontraditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (NTISR) missions. 1 Using FW TACAIR as reconnaissance and collection platforms appears from the outside to be a benign mission, easy to execute and to sustain in extended combat operations. In reality, NTISR missions are very difficult to execute properly and have had negative effects on FW TACAIR.
The USMC must make fundamental changes to the way the NTISR mission is executed because a continued reliance on the FW TACAIR community, despite the benefits, will result in dilapidated airframes and poor combat support. Armed with ROVER and the advanced optics and forward looking infrared radar (FLIR) in the litening pod, commanders began to use the ROVER system to gain real-time information in their areas of operation. A new mission was developed, NTISR.
Background
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NTISR has many faces and tasks associated, but the broad definition is a mission in which a pilot uses his or her advanced targeting pod to look at the enemy, the environment, or any other object, person, place, or thing identified by the supported unit as important to its operation. 6 Because of a lower level of combat intensity, the need for FW TACAIR to provide CAS on a daily basis was no longer necessary. 7 However, the ground combat element had become accustomed to having ROVER with video downlink available overhead 24 hours a day. Commanders liked the idea that they could observe combat operations real time, make quick decisions to engage the enemy decisively, employ the quick reaction force (QRF), or coordinate a medical evacuation with situational awareness previously unknown to ground combat forces. In contrast, the AV-8B
training syllabus has over 50 flights and simulators dedicated to conducting OAS and AAW. NTISR was developed "ad hoc" and thrown at the platforms that were the easiest fit. FW TACAIR platforms are performing a mission in combat that is not established by training standards or by doctrine. In a community built on training standards and regulations, executing the NTISR mission without definable standards or doctrine is ineffective. As a result, squadrons are forced to develop their own training standards for NTISR.
As a result, a wide disparity in execution is created; in simple terms no two units are doing the same thing. The single ship concept was implemented to fulfill the increase in demand for NTISR assets.
Though the increase in support is positive for the GCE, the FW TACAIR communities are being employed in ways that are contrary to doctrine and training standards. 17 With FW TACAIR aircraft utilization three times that of normal operations, pilots and aircraft will only last so long before long term damage is sustained.
Additionally, single ship operations can negatively affect combat operations. When on call CAS is requested for weapons employment, the on station aircraft must coordinate a "join up"
of the section, moving into such proximity that the two aircraft can mutually support each other for threat avoidance or for weapons employment. Because his / her wingman could be upwards of sixty miles away this could delay the process up to ten minutes, maybe longer. With a fluid situation laced with 8 friction and adversity, ten minutes is a lifetime and certainly enough time for an opportunity (to strike the enemy) to be lost.
Counter Argument
ROVER greatly streamlined the CAS 9-line process by allowing FACs and aircrew to quickly validate the target, and provide confirmation that rules of engagement (ROE) were adhered to. 18 In the same respect it changed how reconnaissance was conducted. The FAC and pilot were able to look at the same video and move through the area of operations rapidly gaining valuable imagery and data.
In spite of the damaging effects of high utilization rates, flying NTISR hour after hour, pilots developed a detailed knowledge of the area of operations. This expertise has proved invaluable during those infrequent times in which CAS was requested; pilots were able to progress through the CAS timeline, and deliver ordnance rapidly with great effects to areas with which they had become very familiar.
NTISR allowed the ground combat element (GCE) to have ISR assets available 24/7, and as an added bonus it could bypass the need to request theater ISR assets through the slow and arduous intelligence chain of command.
tasking via the air tasking order (ATO). FACs would then submit the ISR game plan to aircrews via email or chat, and aircrews would show up prepared with points of interest (POI). Many times NTISR was requested by a radio call to the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) and asking for any available aircraft.
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The nearly endless supply of reconnaissance gave commanders flexibility for planning, security, and over watch for many GCE missions.
Undoubtedly, a streamlined CAS process, aircrew familiarity within the area of operations, and increased access to ISR platforms has proven to be combat multipliers to the supported units of OIF. However, those benefits are primarily limited to those opportunities in which ordnance is employed by FW TACAIR.
As mention earlier those missions make up less than five percent of all combat missions flown in OIF. This limited benefit is not commensurate with the damage inflicted upon FW TACAIR squadrons by high utilization rates. In addition, the level of support given to the supported units for 95% of the missions is not driven by doctrine or training standards, resulting in a substandard product with limited gains.
Mitigating the Impact on FW TACAIR
The USMC should fit both the KC-130J and EA-6B with litening pods and provide aircrews with specific training on intelligence collection and analysis to facilitate a true reconnaissance role. The benefits, both platforms have extended times on station and are multi-crew. In addition, KC-130J and the EA-6B gives the supporting unit an extended on station time (4-6 hours), allowing the situation on the ground to develop.
Subsequently, when the situation dictates, FW TACAIR can be called on station to employ ordnance as necessary. This process will limit the high FW TACAIR utilization rates, and ultimately provide a better overall NTISR service to the supported units. 
Conclusion
In the execution of warfare one must remain flexible to his/her surroundings. When a new capability emerges, such as ROVER, changes must be made to maintain the initiative. At the same time, assets must be managed and concepts developed to ensure that the war is fought responsibly. In the last three years NTISR has shown it is here to stay, but during that time it has taken its toll on the FW TACAIR community. NTISR has single handedly "high timed" jets, lowered combat efficiency,
and diminished the quality of service provided to the GCE.
Unless the USMC makes changes now, the FW TACAIR community will continue to deteriorate.
